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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of October 7, 1985 in waters off of the coast of Port Said, Egypt, 
four armed Palestinians seized the Achille Lauro, an Italian registered ship.' The hi-
jackers, who were members of the Palestine Liberation Front, a splinter group of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, ordered the ship to sail for Syrian waters.2 In return 
for the safe release of the ninety-seven passengers on board the ship, the hijackers 
demanded that fifty Palestinians held in Israeli jails be released.5 When Syria refused to 
grant the Achille Lauro permission to land at the port of Tartus, the hijackers threatened 
to kill passengers if their demands were not met.4 The hijackers did, in fact, kill Leon 
Klinghoffer, an elderly, partially disabled American passenger, on October 8, 1985.5 The 
ship sailed back to Port Said, Egypt after being denied entry to Cyprus.6 
Throughout the hijacking, the Palestinians issued and received transmissions to and 
from a shore contact.7 It was alleged that this person was Mohammed Abbas Zaidan 
(Abul Abbas), and that he had actually planned an aborted raid by the hijackers on the 
1 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, § I, at 1, col. 6 (Placing the seizure thirty miles off-shore, outside 
of Egyptian waters). But see N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, § 1, at 7, col. 2. (Displaying a map which 
indicated the seizure as having occurred much closer to the Egyptian coast, perhaps within Egypt's 
territorial waters). 
2 Id., Oct. 9,1985, § I, at 11, col. 6. 
5 Id., Oct. 10, 1985, at All, col. 1. 
4Id. 
• Id., Oct. II, 1985, § I, at I, col. 6. 
6 TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 33. 
7 N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6. 
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Israeli port of Ashdod, rather than the hijacking of the Achille Lauro.8 The shore contact 
apparently negotiated the release of the ship's passengers in exchange for Egypt's guar-
antee of safe passage by plane for the hijackers out of Egypt.9 
Because the Egyptians refused to detain, prosecute, or extradite the Palestinians, 
President Reagan ordered four United States Navy planes to intercept the Egyptian 
aircraft that carried the hijackers and Abbas from Egypt. lO On October 10, 1985, the 
United States Navy forced the aircraft to land at the joint US-NATO Sigonella Airbase 
in Sicily. 11 The United States requested extradition of the hijackers and Abbas. 12 Despite 
this request, Italy allowed Abbas to leave the country because he had diplomatic im-
munity, while Italy retained the four hijackers to prosecute them. I. 
This Note will analyze the actions of the United States during the Achille Lauro 
incident with respect to the role of law in international conflicts. The United States' 
action to gain physical custody of the hijackers was a flagrant violation of international 
law, despite the mission's success in capturing the hijackers and bringing them to trial. 
These actions appear even less legally justifiable in light of the fact that even if the 
United States had succeeded in gaining custody of the hijackers, an attempt by the 
United States to prosecute and convict them may have proven futile because of inade-
quacies in United States domestic law. 
II. THE DOMESTIC CLAIM BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE HIJACKERS 
A. Principles of Jurisdiction 
In order to assert a claim against an individual who allegedly violated its domestic 
law, the United States must be able to prove that it has jurisdiction over the individual. 
There are five principles of jurisdiction recognized in the international community.14 
They are the territorial, the nationality, the passive personality, the protective and the 
universality principles. 
The principle most commonly used to attain jurisdiction is the territorial principle. 
It provides a state with jurisdiction over all acts occurring within its territorial confines 
or on a vessel or aircraft subject to its "flag" jurisdiction.15 The nationality principle gives 
a state competence to prescribe rules regulating the conduct of its nationals wherever 
8Id. 
9 Id., Oct. 13, 1985, § I, at II, col. 2. 
10 Id., Oct. 12, 1985, at A9, col. 1. 
11 Id. 
12 Id., Oct. 12, 1985, § I, at 4, col. 3. 
I. Id., Oct. 20, 1985, § I, at 10, col. 1. 
14 See, e.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom., 
Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 215-16 
(N.D. Cal. 1981); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd. sub nom., 
Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), ceTt. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961). 
15 See cases cited supra note 14. For a discussion of territorial jurisdiction, see Paust, Federal 
Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191,201 (1983); W. BISHOP, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 535, 551 (3d ed. 1971); Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Con-
vention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, arts. 3 & 4, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 41, 42 
(G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965) [hereinafter Harvard Draft]; Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in 
International Law, 11 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 446, 461 (1962), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 
50,66 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965). 
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they are located. 16 Based on the passive personality doctrine, a state may assert extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over anyone, regardless of his or her nationality, who injures one of 
the state's nationals. 17 Unless otherwise impermissible under international law, a state 
may also assert extraterritorial jurisdiction under the protective principle if a significant 
state interest is at stake. 18 A significant state interest is one relating to security, territorial 
integrity, political independence, self-defense,19 and violations of Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter, which includes acts of state terrorism and the toleration, aiding 
and abetting of international terrorism.20 Finally, the universality principle gives a state 
jurisdiction over crimes that affect the international community and are against inter-
nationallaw.21 
States use these five jurisdictional principles as a basis for determining the type of 
human conduct which their laws may regulate. However, the authority of a state to 
enforce such laws comes from a more limited use of jurisdiction known as enforcement 
or criminal jurisdiction. The use of criminal jurisdiction by a state to enforce its domestic 
laws is most often limited to the territorial principle.22 In other words, most countries, 
including the United States, will only assert criminal jurisdiction over acts which have 
occurred within their territorial confines or on a vessel or aircraft registered in their 
country. 
Some civil law countries have, however, extended criminal jurisdiction over extra-
territorial acts by using one of the other principles of jurisdiction. 23 In addition, states 
have extended their jurisdictional claims beyond their territory based on treaty provisions 
with other states.24 Single states also use the universality principle to enforce laws on 
behalf of the international community for extraterritorial crimes so heinous as to be 
considered against all of mankind,25 such as acts of international terrorism. 
16 See Paust, supra note 15, at 203; W. BISHOP, supra note 15, at 531-35, 559; Harvard Draft, 
supra note 15, at 41, 42 (art. 5); Sarkar, supra note 15, at 61-67. 
17 See cases cited supra note 14. For a discussion of the passive personality doctrine, see W. 
BISHOP, supra note 15, at 536-50, 554-55, 559; Sarkar, supra note 15, at 66. 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 
(1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d at 885-887; United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 215-
216; Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d at 549; W. BISHOP, supra note 15, at 551,553,557-61,563; 
Harvard Draft, supra note 15, at 42-43 (art. 7); Sarkar, supra note 15, at 67-72. 
19 Harvard Draft, supra note 15, art. 7; see United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (threat to 
national security); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631 (D.P.R. 1978)(invasion of territory). 
20 See Paust, supra note 15, at 210. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 provides: "All members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations." 
21 See,e.g., Paust, supra note 15, at 211; M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE-THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 1419 (1981); Feller, 
Jurisdiction Over Offenses With a Foreign Element, in 2 A TREATISE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
5, 32-33, 41 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973). 
22 See Paust, supra note 15, at 210 n. 39. 
23 See Dickinson, Introductory Comment to Harvard Research Draft Convention of Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crimes, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 443 (1935). 
241d. 
25 lOp. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821) (Wirt, Att'y Gen.)(citing Grotius). See also Republica v. 
DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 109, 116 (1784)("[C]rimes against the world"); E. DEVATTEL, LAw 
OF NATIONS 464-65 (]. Chitty ed .. 1883)(Recognizing violence against foreign ambassador as a 
"crime against mankind"). 
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B. The United States' Claim 
The United States charged the hijackers involved in the Achille Lauro incident and 
Abul Abbas with piracy on the high seas, hostage taking, and conspiracy.26 Since the 
Italian government retained and prosecuted the four hijackers that were on board the 
ship and released Abbas for reasons of diplomatic immunity, the United States was 
unable to assert its claims. Even if Italy had extradited the hijackers to the United States, 
it is doubtful that the United States would have succeeded in asserting two of its claims 
against the hijackers. The United States' piracy statute may have proven to be insufficient 
to cover the Achille Lauro events, and the United States would probably not have had 
adequate criminal jurisdiction over the hijackers to enforce its hostage taking claim. 
C. The Piracy Charge 
The arrest warrant cited 18 U.S.C. § 1651 as a basis for the piracy charge against 
the hijackers. It reads as follows: 
Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as described by the 
law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, 
shall be imprisoned for life.27 
Thus, the law of nations defines the acts of piracy which are punishable in the 
United States. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas first defined piracy in 1958.28 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention reiterated the definition as follows: 
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any acts of depredation, com-
mitted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or 
private aircraft, and directed: 
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons 
or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
(2) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-
paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.29 
1. Jurisdictional Basis of the Charge 
The United States piracy statute grants jurisdiction to the United States over 
"who[m]ever" commits piracy on the high seas.50 United States criminal or enforcement 
jurisdiction over acts of piracy is thus based on the universality principle. The piracy 
statute does not specify that either the pirates or the victims have to be United States 
nationals, or that the ship has to be of United States "flag" jurisdiction. The United 
States, therefore, may assert extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over a non-national 
26 24 I.L.M. 1509, 1554-57 (1985). 
27 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). 
28 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 
5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter 1958 Geneva Convention]. 
29 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, December 10, 1982, UN Doc. AlCONF. 62/122, art. 101, 
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Law of the Sea Convention]. 
50 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). 
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pirate who commits acts of piracy against non-nationals while on board a ship registered 
in a state other than the United States. 
This universality principle embodied in the United States' piracy statute is reflective 
of the position taken in international law regarding jurisdiction over acts of piracy on 
the high seas. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (the "Geneva Conven-
tion"), defining piracy according to the law of nations, gave the right to seize and try 
pirates found on the high seas to any state.31 Prior to the codification of a piracy definition 
in the Geneva Convention of 1958, Justice Moore of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice had declared the universality principle of jurisdiction as applicable to cases 
of piracy.32 In his dissenting opinion in the Lotus case, Justice Moore stated that "in the 
interest of all," any state could "capture and punish" pirates.33 The problem with the 
United States' piracy claim, therefore, lies not with its jurisdictional basis, but rather with 
the difficulty in fitting both the Achille Lauro hijackers and Abbas within the somewhat 
restrictive definition of piracy articulated in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 
2. Substantive Requirements of the Charge 
a. Private Ends Requirement 
The first issue in determining whether the acts of the Achille Lauro hijackers fell 
into the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention piracy definition involves deciding whether or 
not the hijacking was "committed for private ends" as required by subparagraph (1) of 
the Convention. The Harvard Research Draft of 1932, which became the basis for the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, first articulated this limitation.34 In the 
discussion of the "private ends" requirement in the Harvard Research Draft, the defi-
nition of piracy excluded acts committed for public ends "made on behalf of states, or 
of recognized belligerent organizations, or of unrecognized revolutionary bands."35 
There is a theory that the drafters, by including this private ends limitation in the piracy 
definition, intended to "prevent states from meddling with insurgents acting for public 
ends on the high seas, and to avoid their involvement in the freedom and anticolonial 
movements of the period."36 
In their judicial interpretation of the "private ends" requirement courts examine 
the status of the group committing the act, the status of the group against whom the act 
was committed, and the character of the act itself,37 The group allegedly committing an 
act of piracy is known as an insurgent group. An insurgency's status in the international 
community defines its legal rights and obligations. If a third state neutral to the conflict 
at hand recognizes the insurgent group as "belligerent," then the belligerent group may 
'I 1958 Geneva Convention, art. 19. 
32 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.]., ser. A, No. 10, at 70 (Judgement of Jan. 4)(Moore, 
]., dissenting). 
" Id. 
'4 Harvard Research Draft, art. 39, in 26 AM.]. INT'L L. (Supp. IV 1932). 
'5Id. 
'6 Note, Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 723, 737 
(1986). 
'7 See, e.g., 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 665 (l965)(Status of the insurgents 
who seized the Santa Maria); Magellan Pirat(;s, 164 Eng. Rep. 47, 48 (Ecc. & Ad. 1853)(Status of 
the victims of an insurgency); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1981)(Status of the 
acts of insurgents). 
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achieve a qualified legal status in the international community.38 This recognition of 
belligerency may make the laws of war applicable to the conflict, thereby preventing the 
acts of the belligerent group from being characterized as piracy.39 Therefore, at the very 
least, insurgents must have belligerency status for their acts to qualify under the public 
ends exception to a United States piracy charge. 
The seizure of the Santa Maria, a Portuguese passenger liner, in 1961 by Captain 
Galvao and seventy men posing as passengers involved the issue of a group's belligerency 
status with respect to its alleged acts of piracy.40 The insurgents were members of the 
"National Independence Movement" which opposed the Salazar regime ruling in Por-
tugal.41 Of the 500 to 600 passengers on board, 40 were Americans.42 The insurgents 
killed one member of the crew and injured others.43 Before realizing that the incident 
involved only one ship, and thus the hijacking failed to fulfill the two ships requirement 
of piracy acts under the Geneva Convention, the United States Department of State 
declared the hijacking to be an act of piracy.44 
In labeling the seizure of the Santa Maria as an act of piracy, the United States must 
have con~idered it to have been committed for private rather than for public ends. One 
scholar, in agreeing with this private ends characterization of the seizure, argued that 
the National Independence Movement did not have belligerency status because it was 
not in control of any territory, it did not have a base of operations in the territory it was 
seeking to liberate, and it did not have an organized force of insurgents with its own 
flag. 45 
In determining whether insurgents have committed acts for private ends, courts 
have also examined the status of those against whom the acts are committed and the 
character of such acts.46 In examining the status of the group against whom insurgents 
have committed their acts, a court actually makes a determination of whether or not the 
insurgents acted as belligerents. The English Admiralty Court held in The Magellan 
Pirates case47 that a group of insurgents could be considered as belligerents when acting 
against the legitimate government of the state with which they were in conflict, and as 
pirates when acting against neutral third states. 
In addition, even if insurgents commit acts against members of the state with which 
they are in conflict, the character of the acts themselves may nevertheless cause them to 
be labeled as having been done for private ends, and thus potentially piratical. This may 
occur when the acts committed are not in "furtherance of their rebellion."48 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Eain v. Wilkes defined a "political disturbance," like a public 
'8 See Note, supra note 36, at 738. 
39Id. 
40 See WHITEMAN, supra note 37. 
41Id. 
42Id. at 666. 
43Id. 
44 N. JOYNER, AERIAL HIJACKING AS INTERNATIONAL CRIME III (1974). 
45 Fenwick, Piracy in the Caribbean, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 426, 428 (1961). 
46 See,e.g., Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. at 48; The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 
1885). 
47 Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. at 48. (Officer of Chilean convict settlement and followers 
involved in insurrection against government murdered provincial governor, seized British and 
American vessels, murdering master and passenger of British ship and owner of American ship). 
48 McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair- Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L. REV. 691, 
699 (1985). 
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act, as one "that disrupts the political structure of a State, and not the social structure 
that established the government."49 
In analyzing whether the hijacking of the Achille Lauro amounted to piracy, one 
must determine whether it was done for public or for private ends. The United States 
must have recognized the hijackers as belligerents or their acts would automatically be 
considered as having been committed for "private ends," thereby fulfilling one of the 
requirements of acts of piracy. 50 If the Achille Lauro hijackers were representing only 
the Palestine Liberation Front and the Palestine Liberation Organization neither sup-
ported nor endorsed their actions, as was its claim5!, then the hijackers' actions could 
automatically be characterized as having been committed for "private ends." This is so 
because the Palestine Liberation Front on its own has no status in the international 
community as a belligerent group. 
Alternatively, however, if the hijackers were representing the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, then their actions may not be automatically characterized as fulfilling the 
"private ends" requirement of piracy. Because 115 countries recognize the Palestine 
Liberation Organization and it participates in the United Nations,52 it is arguable that it 
has belligerency status in the international community. However, the United States, in 
proceeding against the hijackers, may itself have had to recognize the belligerency status 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
Even if the United States had recognized the hijackers as belligerents they still may 
have been liable as pirates. In order to escape such liability, they must have committed 
their acts against the legitimate government with whom they were in conflict rather than 
against a neutral group.53 The Palestine Liberation Organization is in conflict with Israel 
regarding the acquisition of a homeland, not with Italy- the flag state of the Achille 
Lauro- or with the various countries, including the United States, of which the passengers 
on board the ship were nationals. 
In addition, even if recognized belligerents committed the act against the govern-
ment with which they are in conflict, such act must disrupt the political and not the 
social structure of that government in order to be considered in "furtherance of their 
rebellion" and not an act of pi racy. 54 The hijacking of an Italian cruise ship (and the 
killing of an American passenger), however, disrupts the social, not the political, structure 
of all the countries involved and, therefore, was not an act in "furtherance of the 
[Palestine Liberation Organization's] rebellion." The acts of the hijackers during the 
Achille Lauro affair seem, then, to fulfill the requirement in the definition of piracy as 
having been done for private ends. 
b. High Seas Requirement 
The second requirement in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention definition of piracy 
is that the act occur on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state.55 There is 
49 Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 520-21. (Court found defendants' bombing in Israel which killed 
two boys, injured 30 others as not incidental to the conflict with Israel). 
50 See Note, supra note 36, at 738. 
51 N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3. 
52 O'Brien, The PLO in International Law, 2 B. U. INT'L L. J. 349, 360, 379-81 (1983). 
53 Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. at 48. 
54 Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 520-21. 
55 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 29. 
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some dispute as to where the hijacking of the Achille Lauro actually began.56 After 
seizing the ship, the hijackers directed its captain to leave Egyptian waters, thereby 
implying that the seizure had taken place within Egyptian waters and not on the high 
seas.57 Egyptian authorities, however, allegedly placed the initial seizure about 30 miles 
off of the Egyptian coast58, outside of Egypt's territorial limits. 
While the initial seizure mayor may not have occurred within Egypt's territorial 
waters, the hijacking continued while the ship traveled into the high seas. This continued 
act of hijacking may bring the act within the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention definition 
of piracy regardless of where the initial seizure occurred. In The Magellan Pirates case, 
rebels seized two vessels in port, where they murdered several persons before sailing the 
ships into the high seas.59 The English Admiralty Court considered the eventual posses-
sion of the vessels by the rebels on the high seas to be piracy regardless of the fact that 
the seizure had begun in port.60 
c. Two Ships Requirement 
A third requirement of the definition of piracy in the 1982 Law of the Sea Conven-
tion is that two ships be involved.61 This presents a problem in characterizing the Achille 
Lauro incident as piracy because the hijackers did not board the ship from another 
private ship as the Convention requires.62 The original purpose behind the two ships 
requirement was to protect international trade on the high seas by preventing pirates 
from seizing commercial vessels. There is support for eliminating the two ships require-
ment as "in an age when luxury liners and cruise ships carry passengers from many 
nations, threats of attack are as likely to come from within a ship as they are from 
without it."63 Another argument, to minimize the effect of the two ships requirement, is 
that while the definition of piracy as originally articulated in the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas may represent "the extent to which a general agreement could be 
reached," it should not replace reasoning as a final statement on the matter.64 
Therefore, in order to put piracy in the context of present realities, the United 
States may not feel bound by the traditional and historical two ships requirement if new 
situations have arisen which the drafters of the Geneva Convention did not contemplate 
or address in 1958. The new reality of ship passengers taking them over seems to render 
the treaty's language inadequate and obsolete. However, the two ships requirement still 
stands within the Convention's definition of piracy. Consequently, this requirement 
remains in the United States piracy statute with its reference to the law of the nations 
definition of piracy. Therefore, this lingering two ships requirement in the definition of 
piracy makes it doubtful that the United States could have successfully asserted its piracy 
charge against the Achille Lauro hijackers. 
56 See McGinley, supra note 48, at 695. 
57 N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, § I, at I, col. 6. 
58Id. 
59 Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. at 47. 
60 Id. at 50. 
61 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 29. 
6°ld. 
63 See Note, supra note 36, at 749. 
64 See McGinley, supra note 48, at 696-97; D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 531-32 (1976). 
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D. The Hostage Taking Charge 
l. Substantive Requirements of the Charge 
The United States and Egypt are both parties to the 1979 United Nations Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (hereinafter the "Hostages Conven-
tion") which imposes an obligation on parties to the treaty to prosecute or extradite 
offenders.65 An "offender" is defined as follows under Article 1 of the Convention: 
(1) Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to 
continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") 
in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergov-
ernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, 
to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for 
the release of the hostages ("hostage taking") within the meaning of this 
Convention. 
(2) Any person who: 
(a) attempts to commit an act of hostage taking, or 
(b) participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to 
commit an act of hostage taking likewise commits an offense for the purposes 
of this Convention.66 
2. Jurisdictional Basis of the Charge 
It appears that the United States, as a member to this Hostages Convention, had a 
substantive cause of action against the Achille Lauro hijackers based on the Convention 
language. However, there are problems with its assertion of jurisdiction over the hijackers 
for such a hostage taking claim. To begin with, the hijackers involved in the Achille 
Lauro affair apparently were Lebanese nationals, and Lebanon was not a party to the 
Hostages Convention.67 The Hostages Convention gives signing members the right to 
try each others' nationals for treaty offenses.68 However, as Lebanon did not sign the 
Hostages Convention, the United States could not claim jurisdiction over the hijackers 
based on the provisions of the Convention. 
In addition, there is some question as to whether, under domestic law, the United 
States can claim criminal jurisdiction based on treaty provisions alone. Some scholars 
assert that United States federally prosecutable crimes cannot be created by treaty 
language alone without having an additional basis of Congressional legislation.69 This 
assumption is based on an analogy to the decision in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin 
in which the United States Supreme Court objected to criminal prosecutions based on 
federal common law alone.70 
65 1979 International Convention for the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 
34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. DOC A/CONF. 6/34/L.23 (1979) [hereinafter Hostages 
Convention]. 
66 [d., art. 1. 
67 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE ON JANUARY I, 1985304. 
68 See 1979 Hostages Convention, supra note 65. 
69 See,e.g., Paust, supra note 15, at 219; H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROB-
LEMS 584 (1968,; Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 239, 259 
(G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965). 
70 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 31 (1812). 
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It remains at least uncertain whether violations of international treaty law, like 
violations of federal common law, must have an additional domestic legislative basis for 
criminal prosecutions in the United States.71 Despite these restraints, the United States 
may still be free to exercise criminal jurisdiction over hostage taking offenders, as the 
hostage taking offense has been legislatively incorporated into the United States Code 
by the Crime Control Act. 72 
When the Crime Control Act was introduced, the President expressed that the 
passive personality doctrine was to be the basis for jurisdiction over a hostage taking 
offender.73 This doctrine would allow the United States to assert criminal jurisdiction 
over anyone who took a national of the United States hostage. Article 5(l)(d) of the 
Hostages Convention also designates the passive personality doctrine as giving a state 
jurisdiction over an offender who takes "a hostage who is a national of that state."74 
There are inconsistencies in the designation of the passive personality doctrine as the 
jurisdictional basis over the Achille Lauro hijackers by the United States for a hostage 
taking claim, however, as the doctrine is not well accepted as international law7s, and the 
United States has explicitly rejected it.76 
In United States v. Columba-Colella the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the use 
of the passive personality doctrine by the United States as a jurisdictional basis over an 
Italian national who kidnapped a United States general in Italy.77 The six dissenting 
judges in the Permanent Court of International Justice'S (the "PCI],,) opinion in the 
Lotus case took a similar position of rejecting the passive personality doctrine.78 The 
majority of the PCIJ refused to decide on the validity of the doctrine, instead finding 
jurisdiction in the case based on the territorial principle.79 
A principal objection to the passive personality principle is that jurisdiction should 
not depend on "the fortuity of the victim's nationality."80 In addition, although never 
articulated, it is possible that the United States may object to the doctrine because of 
due process concerns. The United States may be fearful of subjecting its own nationals 
to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of some other country, which may have potentially less 
adequate due process standards than those guaranteed in the United States. 
Despite these objections, due to changes in circumstances over the past two decades, 
passive personality may now be a logical and fair basis of jurisdiction in international 
and domestic law.81 Recent acts of terrorism in which governments have been "held 
ransom by threats of violence against their nationals," the constant movement throughout 
the world of the terrorists perpetrating such offenses, and the fact that victims are often 
singled out because of their nationality are among these new circumstances.82 It is now 
often impossible for a state to gain the most well accepted territorial based criminal 
71 See Paust, supra note 15, at 220. 
72 H.R. Doc. No. 211, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1984)(amending 18 U.S.C. 1201(e)(l982)). 
73 Id. 
74 1979 Hostages Conve.ntion, supra note 65, art. 5(l)(d). 
75 See Paust, supra note 15, at 202 n.43. 
76Id. at 202 n.4l; United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979). 
77 United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d at 360. 
78 See the Lotus case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.]., ser. A, No. 10, at 70. 
79Id. 
80 See McGinley, supra note 48, at 712; GREIG, supra note 64, at 390-91. 
81 See McGinley, supra note 48, at 712-13. 
82Id. 
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jurisdiction over an offender, because offenders often leave a state immediately after 
committing their illegal acts. In light of these changed circumstances, there no longer 
seems to be support for the principal objection to passive personality that jurisdiction 
should not depend on the "fortuity of the victim's nationality." This objection is partic-
ularly undermined by the fact that terrorists often intentionally, not fortuitously, victimize 
individuals and their countries because of their nationalities.83 
While the passive personality doctrine is still emerging as an accepted principle of 
international law, in applying the doctrine to the Achille Lauro affair, the United States 
would have been using it as domestic law in its domestic court system. Therefore, the 
position that the international community has taken on the validity of passive personality 
would not have been controlling. However, the United States, having previously rejected 
the doctrine in the Columba-Colella case84, would have to have changed its position and 
accepted its validity in order to have been able to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the 
alleged hostage takers. 
A United States acceptance of the passive personality doctrine would have been 
particularly essential in the context of the Achille Lauro incident. This is true because 
the United States could not have claimed jurisdiction over the hijackers for the hostage 
taking claim on the strength of its signing of the 1979 Hostages Convention to which 
Lebanon, from which the hijackers claimed their nationality, was not a party.8S 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES' ACTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The United States' military actions in trying to gain physical custody of the hijackers 
violated international law. It was not legal for the United States to force the Egyptian 
aircraft carrying the hijackers to land in Sicily. There is a right of a subjacent state to 
interfere with the flight of another state's aircraft in certain circumstances as recognized 
by the 1963 Tokyo Convention of Offenses Committed on Board Aircraft.86 However, 
in 1973 the United Nations Security Council unanimously disapproved of the intercep-
tion of a Lebanese aircraft in Lebanese airspace by Israeli military jets seeking to gain 
custody of a Palestinian on board who had allegedly killed crew members and passengers 
of a hijacked aircraft.87 The Security Council members, including the United States, 
stated that Israel's action had violated the United Nations Charter.s8 Thus, it appears 
that a right of a state to interfere with an aircraft's flight does not exist if the aircraft is 
not over the territory of that state. In support of this proposition, Article 14 of the 
Hostages Convention disallows use of the Convention to justify violating "the territorial 
integrity or political independence of a state in contravention of the Charter of the 
United Nations."s9 
By allowing the hijackers to escape from its territory on board the Egyptian aircraft, 
Egypt allegedly failed to comply with its obligation under the Hostages Convention to 
prosecute or extradite the hijackers. However, even under the terms of the Hostages 
83Id. at 713. 
84 United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d at 360. 
85 See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 67. 
86 Article 4, The Tokyo Convention on Crimes Aboard Aircraft 1963, Sept. 14, 1963,20 U.S.T. 
2941, T.I.A.S. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; see McGinley, supra note 48, at 719-72l. 
87 See 28 U.N.SCOR (1740th mtg.), Res. & Dec. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/Res/337 (1973). 
88Id. 
89 See 1979 Hostages Convention, supra note 65, art. 14. 
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Convention, Egypt was not obligated to extradite the hijackers to the United States as 
no valid extradition treaty existed between the two countries.90 Thus, the United States 
could not point to Egypt's alleged breach of its obligation in order to justify its illegal 
interception of the Egyptian aircraft carrying the hijackers. 
Even if such an extradition treaty had existed between the two countries, the United 
States would still not have been justified in its actions. Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter91 , as well as the International Court of Justice's opinion in the Corfu Channel 
case92, makes it illegal to use self-help to restore violated rights. 
It seems quite clear that the United States' grounding of the Egyptian aircraft was 
in violation of international law. Therefore, it is understandable that the United States 
has never claimed that its actions were valid or legal under internationallaw.93 
In addition, the United States' illegal efforts to gain custody of the hijackers may 
well have caused it to lose any jurisdiction it might have originally had over them.94 The 
Executive branch, as well as the other two branches, is bound in its powers both by the 
Constitution and by "general norms of international law."95 Therefore, in violating 
international law by intercepting the Egyptian aircraft, the United States in essence 
violated international due process standards and could have lost its jurisdiction over the 
hijackers.96 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While one can argue that the United States' show of force in dealing with the 
terrorists in the Achille Lauro affair was a necessary deterrent against future acts of 
terrorism, this argument involves an intrusion of political issues into the question of the 
legality of the United States' actions. In order to further the role of law and enable the 
United States, as well as other countries, to successfully punish and thereby deter acts 
of terrorism, an analysis of the law as it exists today is necessary. This becomes especially 
clear when analyzing the United States' involvement in the Achille Lauro affair. Even 
once United States navy planes had forced the grounding of the Egyptian aircraft 
carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers, existing laws may have proven inadequate for the 
assertion of United States' claims against the hijackers. Rather than continuing to ignore 
these existing laws, the United States should update them or change its interpretation 
and application of them so that heinous acts of terrorism will fall within the scope of 
these laws as well as within United States criminal jurisdiction. 
For example, to begin with, the United States could and should revise its piracy 
statute to remove reference to the outdated and obsolete two ships requirement in the 
law of nations piracy definition. Then, hijackers such as those on the Achille Lauro, who 
pose as passengers and take over a ship, would fall within the statute. Two ships could 
90 See McGinley, supra note 48, at 717. 
91 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. 
92 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.]. 4. 
93 See McGinley, supra note 48, at 721. 
94 See,e.g., Paust, supra note 15, at 217; Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120-21 
(l933)(Jurisdiction voided where government seized vessel in violation of treaty). 
95 See Paust, supra note 15, at 217; Paust, Is The President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land-
Foreign Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719 (1982); United States 
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-78, 280 (2d Cir. 1974). 
96 See Paust, supra note 15, at 217-18; Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. at 120-21. 
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still be involved in acts of piracy, but such would not be an absolute requirement for the 
offense. Similarly, the law of nations definition of piracy in the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention should be revised to eliminate the two ships requirement. 
In order to be able to assert claims against terrorists who commit hostage taking 
offenses against United States victims outside of its territory, the United States would 
have to change its position and recognize the passive personality doctrine as a valid basis 
of criminal jurisdiction. To further strengthen United States criminal jurisdiction over 
alleged hostage taking offenders, the United States could attempt to secure extradition 
treaties with as many other parties to the Hostages Convention as possible, including 
Lebanon and Egypt. 
Finally, all countries may want to advance the universality principle as a basis for 
criminal jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, as such crimes are so heinous that any 
state should be able to prosecute the offenders on behalf of the whole international 
community. 
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